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Modelling Opacity Using Petri Nets
Jeremy W. Bryans, Maciej Koutny and Peter Y. A. Ryan1 ,2
School of Computing Science
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Abstract
We consider opacity as a property of the local states of the secure (or high-level) part of the system,
based on the observation of the local states of a low-level part of the system as well as actions.
We propose a Petri net modelling technique which allows one to specify diﬀerent information ﬂow
properties, using suitably deﬁned observations of system behaviour. We then discuss expressiveness
of the resulting framework and the decidability of the associated veriﬁcation problems.
Keywords: opacity, non-deducibility, Petri nets, observable behaviour
1 Introduction
The notion of secrecy has been formulated in various ways in the computer
security literature. One well known formulation is that of non-interference,
generally attributed to Goguen and Meseguer in [5] and [6], but the idea can
be traced back to earlier work of Feiertag [3] and Cohen [2]. This seeks to
formalise the absence of any information ﬂow or more precisely, the absence
of any causal ﬂow from one process to another. A reformulation of this notion
in terms of structural characteristics of Petri nets has recently been given by
Busi and Gorrieri [1].
In this paper we examine a diﬀerent approach to formulating information
ﬂow policies, following an approach that can be traced back to the notion
of non-deducibility due to Sutherland [11]. The essential idea is to stipulate
1 This research was supported by the EPSRC GOLD and SCREEN projects and DSTL
2 {jeremy.bryans, peter.ryan, maciej.koutny}@newcastle.ac.uk
Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science 121 (2005) 101–115
1571-0661 © 2005 Elsevier B.V. 
www.elsevier.com/locate/entcs
doi:10.1016/j.entcs.2004.10.010
Open access under CC BY-NC-ND license. 
that whatever observations an uncleared user may make of the system, the
space of possible high level (secret) inputs consistent with those observations
is unchanged. In other words, the uncleared user should be unable to make
any useful deductions about the interactions of a secret user with the system.
A number of problems and limitations of the original formulation have been
noted over the years and several variants proposed. An overview can be found
in [9].
A variant of the idea has appeared recently in the context of the analysis
of security protocols as the notion of opacity [4]. Whereas non-interference
seeks to capture the complete absence of information ﬂow, opacity is speciﬁc
to a particular item of information. Thus, for example, the value of a vari-
able v say, is deemed to be opaque for a particular run of a protocol if the
adversary is unable to deduce its value from the observations and deductions
available to him during the run. For the protocol to satisfy such a require-
ment it must be the case that, for any alternative value of v, there is another
possible run of the protocol that gives rise to observations by the adversary
that are indistinguishable from the original observations. Of course care has
to be taken over the deﬁnition of ‘indistinguishability’ here, especially in the
presence of cryptography and non-determinism. A specialisation of this notion
is to require that the adversary be unable to determine the satisfaction of a
particular property.
A number of important information ﬂow requirements are naturally cap-
tured by such a formulation. Anonymity is a prime example of a situation
where some information ﬂow is permitted whilst particular items of informa-
tion must be kept secret. Thus, for ballot secrecy, it will typically be regarded
as acceptable for an observer to know that a particular member of the elec-
torate cast a vote, but it is essential that the actual vote is kept secret.
Similarly, for encrypted channels and cryptographic protocols, it is often
regarded as acceptable or unavoidable that an adversary can perform traﬃc
analysis, observe sources, destinations and lengths of messages, but essential
that the contents of the messages remain secret.
Such scenarios ﬁt awkwardly into traditional, strict formulations of non-
interference which regard information ﬂow as a binary property.
Note that, as is standard in the modelling of information ﬂows, we assume
that the adversary has full knowledge of the construction of the system. This
is an analogue of Kerckhoﬀs’ principle in cryptography of not seeking security
in obscurity and is in eﬀect a worst case assumption.
In this paper we extend the notion of opacity to systems in general, rather
than just to cryptographic protocols and cast it in the framework of Petri
nets. The ﬂexibility in deﬁning the adversary’s visibility of transitions and
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places as well as ﬂexibility of predicates over states allows us to express very
rich information ﬂow requirements. The ability to deﬁne arbitrary adversary
views of the system state gives a convenient way to model certain threat
scenarios, e.g., various forms of probing using side channel analysis.
Casting our models in Petri nets gives us access to a raft of existing results
and tools that have been developed in the Petri net community.
2 Petri nets
In this section, we introduce Petri nets with weighted arcs [7], and give their
operational semantics in terms of step sequences.
A (weighted) net is a triple N = (P, T,W ) such that P and T are disjoint
ﬁnite sets, and W : (T × P ) ∪ (P × T ) → N. The elements of P and T
are respectively the places and transitions, and W is the weight function of
N . In diagrams, places are drawn as circles, and transitions as rectangles. If
W (x, y) ≥ 1 for some (x, y) ∈ (T ×P )∪ (P × T ), then (x, y) is an arc leading
from x to y. As usual, arcs are annotated with their weight if this is 2 or more.
We assume that, for every t ∈ T , there is a place p such that W (p, t) ≥ 1.
The pre- and post-multiset of a transition t ∈ T are multisets of places,
preN (t) and postN (t), respectively given by
preN (t)(p) = W (p, t) and postN (t)(p) = W (t, p),
for all p ∈ P . Both notations extend to ﬁnite multisets of transitions U :
preN (U) =
∑
t∈U
U(t) · preN (t) and postN (U) =
∑
t∈U
U(t) · postN (t) .
A marking of a net N is a multiset of places. Following the standard
terminology, given a marking M of N and a place p ∈ P , we say that p is
marked if M(p) ≥ 1 and that M(p) is the number of tokens in p. In diagrams,
M will be represented by drawing in each place p exactly M(p) tokens (black
dots).
Transitions represent actions which may occur at a given marking and then
lead to a new marking. Here we deﬁne this dynamics in terms of multisets of
(simultaneously occurring) transitions.
A step is a non-empty ﬁnite multiset of transitions, U : T → N. It is
enabled at a marking M if M ≥ preN (U). Thus, in order for U to be enabled
at M , for each place p, the number of tokens in p under M should at least
be equal to the total number of tokens that are needed as an input to U ,
respecting the weights of the input arcs.
If U is enabled at M , then it can be executed leading to the marking
M ′ = M−preN (U)+postN (U). This means that the execution of U ‘consumes’
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from each place p exactly W (p, t) tokens for each occurrence of a transition
t ∈ U that has p as an input place, and ‘produces’ in each place p exactly
W (t, p) tokens for each occurrence of a transition t ∈ U with p as an output
place. If the execution of U leads from M to M ′ we write M [U〉M ′.
An execution from a marking M to a marking M ′ is a sequence
µ = MU1M1 . . .Mn−1UnM ′
such that
M [U1〉M1 · · · Mn−1 [Un〉M ′ .
We also say that M ′ is reachable from M .
3 Observing Petri net behaviour
In this section, we introduce a speciﬁc device aimed at modelling various
observation capabilities based on the executed behaviours of a Petri net. Our
framework is deliberately general to allow one to deal with a wider range of
observation scenarios.
We start by making a small (but important from the point of view of
applications) adjustment of the standard notion of a marked net, by assuming
that the system speciﬁcation we are given at the outset is a pair Σ = (N,M0),
where N is a net as deﬁned in the previous section and M0 is a non-empty
ﬁnite set of initial markings. This allows us to easily model situations where
only partial information of the initial state of the system is available to an
observer.
We will denote by [M0〉 the set of all markings reachable from any of
the markings in M0, and by RG(Σ) the reachability graph of Σ deﬁned as
the labelled directed graph whose nodes are the markings in [M0〉, and the
labelled arcs represent all steps executed at these markings according to the
rules from the previous section (see, e.g., ﬁgure 2(a,b) for an example of a net
with a single initial marking and its reachability graph). We will denote by
RGsteps(Σ) the set of all the steps labelling the arcs of RG(Σ).
3.1 Visibility of reachable markings and executed steps
In our approach, we assume that there is a mapping obs which for each reach-
able marking in [M0〉 and every step of executed transitions in RGsteps(Σ)
returns some label. This label is meant to capture the observable or visible
aspects of system behaviour, in this case global states (markings) and executed
actions (steps of transitions). We do not place any restrictions on the nature
of the obs mapping at this point; indeed, it is left under-speciﬁed deliberately
to accommodate a wide range of observation scenarios.
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Suitable choices of obs mapping can be used to encode the various levels
of visibility of system behaviour that we attribute to the environment or ad-
versary. Thus transitions visible only to a secret user might be mapped to a τ
label. Such events would be completely invisible to the environment, i.e., the
environment would not be aware that any transition had occurred. Transi-
tions corresponding to the transmission of encrypted values could be mapped
to a single label. We discuss ﬂavours of invisibility further in section 3.3.
Transitions deemed visible to the adversary may be left unchanged.
Note that, in particular, obs allows us to ‘detect’ properties like deadlock-
freeness or acceptance sets. The theory is rich enough to incorporate and
reason about them. It is another matter, of course, how deadlocks would be
detected or observed in the real life system, but these issues are beyond the
scope of the current paper.
We assume that markings and steps are visible using diﬀerent sets of ob-
served labels (i.e., obs(M) = obs(U), for all M ∈ [M0〉 and U ∈ RGsteps(Σ));
in other words, observers can always distinguish between a state and a tran-
sition.
The two basic forms of deﬁning the obs mapping are transition labelling
and marking projection. In the ﬁrst case, we assume that each transition t
has its own (not necessarily unique) label (t) and then the visibility of a step
U = {t1, . . . , tk} is deﬁned as the multiset (U) = {(t1), . . . , (tk)}. In the
case of marking projection, we assume that Vis ⊆ P is a set of places on
which we can always see the tokens, and all places in P \Vis are hidden from
us (in the extreme case, Vis = ∅ which eﬀectively means that no information
about the tokens is available). Then, for every marking M , we deﬁne M |Vis
as a multiset over Vis such that M |Vis(p) = M(p) for every place p ∈ Vis .
Having deﬁned the observable aspects of individual markings and steps of
transitions, it is straightforward to deﬁne the eﬀect of the observation mapping
on the executions of the marked net Σ: given an execution
µ = M0U1M1 . . .Mn−1UnMn,
where M0 ∈M0, we observe it as the sequence
obs(µ) = obs(M0)obs(U1)obs(M1) . . . obs(Mn−1)obs(Un)obs(Mn).
The whole behaviour of Σ can now be viewed as the labelled directed graph
obs(RG(Σ)) obtained from RG(Σ) by replacing each arc label U by obs(U),
and by labelling each node M by obs(M). Moreover, any actual observation
of the system behaviour is simply a sequence of node and arc labels along any
directed path originating from one of the initial nodes.
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3.2 Opacity
In the present framework, we are interested in whether an observer can es-
tablish a property P at some speciﬁc state(s) of the execution of the system
solely on the basis of its visible version. We consider here any state property,
i.e., one which can be evaluated at any reachable marking in [M0〉. Clearly,
any such property can simply be represented as the set of those reachable
markings where it holds, and so we will take P to be any subset of [M0〉.
Now, given an observable execution of the system, we will be interested
in ﬁnding out whether the fact that an underlying marking belongs to P can
be deduced by the observer. Note, however, that we are not interested in
establishing whether the underlying marking does not belong to P. To do
this, we would rather consider the property P = [M0〉 \ P.
What it means to deduce a property can mean diﬀerent things depending
on what is relevant or important from the point of view of real application.
Below, we formalise three possible ways of deﬁning variants of opacity:
• P is initial-opaque if for every execution µ from any marking M0 ∈M0∩P,
there exists an execution µ′ from a marking M ′0 ∈M0\P such that obs(µ) =
obs(µ′).
I.e., we are only interested in the holding of our property in the initial state.
• P is ﬁnal-opaque if for every execution µ from any marking M0 ∈M0 to a
marking M̂ ∈ P, there exists an execution µ′ from a marking M ′0 ∈ M0 to
a marking M̂ ′ /∈ P such that obs(µ) = obs(µ′).
I.e., we are only interested in the holding of our property in the current
state.
• P is always-opaque if for every execution
µ = M0U1M1 . . .Mn−1UnMn
from any marking M0 ∈M0 and every i ≤ n such that Mi ∈ P, there exists
an execution
µ′ = M ′0U
′
1M
′
1 . . .M
′
n−1U
′
nM
′
n
from a marking M ′0 ∈M0 such that obs(µ) = obs(µ′) and M ′i /∈ P.
I.e., we are interested in the holding of our property at all states of the
observed execution.
Later on, initial-opacity is illustrated by the dining cryptographers ex-
ample. It would appear that it is suited to modelling situations in which
initialisation information such as crypto keys, etc., needs to be kept secret.
More generally, situations in which conﬁdential information can be modelled
in terms of initially resolved non-determinism can be captured in this way.
On the other hand, always-opacity would seem more appropriate to capture
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situation in which secret information is input at run time, for example due to
high level interactions. We will be exploring the application of these formal
properties in a future paper.
Proposition 3.1 If P is always-opaque then it is both initial-opaque and
ﬁnal-opaque; no other implication of this kind in general holds.
Proof. The ﬁrst part follows from the deﬁnitions. Moreover, together with
the two counterexamples below, it implies that the second part holds as well.
The ﬁrst example shows that in general initial-opacity does not imply
ﬁnal-opacity. Take the net in ﬁgure 1(a) with the initial markings M0 =
{{s1, s2}, {s1}} (the reachability graph is shown in ﬁgure 1(b)). Assume fur-
ther that obs is given by the transition labelling (t) = a, and marking projec-
tion on the place s1. The resulting observation graph is shown in ﬁgure 1(c).
Suppose now that we are interested in establishing that the invisible place s2
is non-empty, which is captured by P = [M0〉 \ {{s1}}. It is easily seen that
P is initial-opaque, but it is not ﬁnal-opaque (basically, after executing the
only transition, s2 is bound to contain at least one token).
The second example shows that ﬁnal-opacity does not imply initial-opacity.
Take the net in ﬁgure 1(d) with the initial markings M0 = {{s},∅} (the
reachability graph is shown in ﬁgure 1(e)). Assume further that obs is given by
the transition labelling (t) = (u) = a, and marking projection on the empty
set of places. The resulting observation graph is shown in ﬁgure 1(f). Suppose
now that we are interested in establishing that the invisible place s contains a
token, which is captured by P = {{s}}. It is easily seen that P is ﬁnal-opaque,
but it is not initial-opaque (basically, after executing any sequence of the two
transitions, we know for sure that s must have contained initially a token, but
since we have no idea which of the two transitions was executed at the end of
the sequence, the current marking of s is undetermined). 
Proposition 3.2 For x ∈ {initial , ﬁnal , always}, it is the case that P = ∅ is
x-opaque, P = [M0〉 is not x-opaque, and if P ⊆ P ′ and P ′ is x-opaque then
P is x-opaque.
Proof. Follows from deﬁnitions. 
What now follows are crucial results stating that the three notions of opac-
ity are decidable provided that the system has ﬁnitely many states.
Theorem 3.3 If [M0〉 is ﬁnite 3 then it is decidable whether P is initial-
opaque.
3 Note that the ﬁniteness of [M0〉 is decidable, and can be checked using the standard
coverability tree construction [7].
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(a)
s1
s2
t
(b)
{s1, s2}
{s2, s2}
{s1}
{s2}
{t} {t}
(c)
{s1}
∅
{s1}
∅
{a} {a}
(d)
s
t
u
{u}
(e)
{s}
∅
{t}
{a}
(f)
∅
∅
{a}
Fig. 1. Two counterexamples for the proof of proposition 3.1.
Proof. The proof of this and the next two results are based on a language-
theoretic argument centered around a directed graph G obtained from RG(Σ)
in the following way: for each arc (M,U,M ′), the label U is changed to the
two-label sequence obs(U)obs(M ′). Note that G is ﬁnite since [M0〉 is ﬁnite
and so RG(Σ) is a ﬁnite reachability graph.
To decide initial-opacity we proceed as follows. First, we construct a ﬁ-
nite state machine F1 by taking G with a fresh initial node connected by an
obs(M)-arc with every node M ∈ M0 ∩ P, and all the states being treated
as ﬁnal. After that we construct in a similar way a ﬁnite state machine F2,
except that now the initial node is connected by an obs(M)-arc with every
node M ∈M0 \ P.
It is easy to see that P is initial-opaque iﬀ L(F1) ⊆ L(F2), where L(Fi) is
the language accepted by Fi. 
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Theorem 3.4 If [M0〉 is ﬁnite then it is decidable whether P is ﬁnal-opaque.
Proof. First, we construct a ﬁnite state machine F1 by taking G with a fresh
initial node connected by an obs(M)-arc with every node M ∈M0, and all the
states in [M0〉 ∩P being treated as ﬁnal. After that we construct in a similar
way a ﬁnite state machine F2, except that now all the states in [M0〉 \ P are
treated as ﬁnal.
It is easy to see that P is ﬁnal-opaque iﬀ L(F1) ⊆ L(F2). 
Theorem 3.5 If [M0〉 is ﬁnite then it is decidable whether P is always-
opaque.
Proof. Let ξ = (M, ll′,M ′) be any arc in G such that M ′ ∈ P. First, we
construct a ﬁnite state machine F ξ1 by taking G with a fresh initial node
connected by an obs(M̂)-arc with every node M̂ ∈M0, an extra arc (M, a,M ′)
where a is a fresh label, and all the states in [M0〉 being treated as ﬁnal. After
that we construct a ﬁnite state machine F ξ2 by taking G with a fresh initial
node connected by an obs(M̂)-arc with every node M̂ ∈ M0, an extra arc
(M̂, a, M̂ ′) for each existing arc (M̂, ll′, M̂ ′) in G such that M̂ ′ /∈ P, and all
the states in [M0〉 being treated as ﬁnal.
It is easy to see that P is always-opaque iﬀ P is initial-opaque and, for
every arc ξ as above, L(F ξ1 ) ∩ L ⊆ L(F ξ2 ), where L is the language generated
by the regular expression A∗aA∗ and A is the set of all arc labels used in F ξ1
except for the label a. 
3.3 Invisible transitions
So far we have tacitly assumed that it is always possible to observe in some
way every step of executed transitions (i.e., some label is always generated).
However, one might also wish to deal with totally invisible transitions and
steps. We now will outline how such a feature could be incorporated within
our present framework.
To start with, we assume that there is a special label τ which can be used
to label steps of transitions which are completely invisible to an observer.
Moreover, we assume that executing an invisible step does not change the
visibility of the marking (any such change would indicate that something must
have been executed even if we do not know what). Then, given an execution
µ = M0U1M1 . . .Mn−1UnMn, where M0 ∈ M0, we denote by obsτ (µ) the
sequence obtained from
obs(M0)obs(U1)obs(M1) . . .obs(Mn−1)obs(Un)obs(Mn)
by deleting all pairs obs(Ui)obs(Mi) such that obs(Ui) = τ . With this modiﬁed
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deﬁnition of observability, our notions of opacity are re-stated:
• P is τ -initial-opaque if for every execution µ from any marking M ∈M0 ∩
P, there exists an execution µ′ from a marking M ′ ∈ M0 \ P such that
obsτ (µ) = obsτ (µ
′).
• P is τ -ﬁnal-opaque if for every execution µ from any marking M ∈ M0 to
a marking M̂ ∈ P, there exists an execution µ′ from a marking M ′ ∈ M0
to a marking M̂ ′ /∈ P such that obsτ (µ) = obsτ (µ′).
The case of always-opacity is more complicated and will be discussed in a
forthcoming paper. What is important, however, is that the properties already
established in this paper for diﬀerent forms of opacity carry over to their τ -
versions.
3.4 Step vs. interleaving semantics
In this paper we adopted the step semantics of Petri nets. But the whole dis-
cussion could just as well be carried out in terms of the interleaving semantics.
No change to the notions developed nor the results would be necessary (other
than assuming that all executions are based on singleton steps of transitions).
The resulting model, however, would not be equivalent to the current one.
Take, for example, the net in ﬁgure 2(a) (with exactly one initial marking
{s1, s3}, as shown in the diagram), whose reachability graph RG(Σ) is given in
ﬁgure 2(b). Assume further that all steps are ‘visible’ as the same label a, and
that each reachable marking M is visible as the projection M |{s4,s5}. Applying
obs to the reachability graph results in the graph obs(RG(Σ)) in ﬁgure 2(c).
Moreover, under the interleaving semantics, the graph obs(RG(Σ)) is as in
ﬁgure 2(d).
Suppose now that we are interested in establishing whether the system
is ﬁnal-opaque w.r.t. the presence of a token in place s2; in other words,
P = {{s2, s4, s5}}. Then, using the interleaving version we can ﬁnd that after
the observed execution ∅a{s4, s5} the place s2 is marked, and so P is not
ﬁnal-opaque. On the other hand, the same cannot be established using the
graph in ﬁgure 2(c) based on steps of transitions; in fact, in this case P is
ﬁnal-opaque.
4 Dining cryptographers
To illustrate our approach, we use a simpliﬁed (and more intimate) version
of the dining cryptographers with just two dining companions. This version
is also used in [4]. The standard dining cryptographers involves three diners
and admits some further anonymity properties, e.g., a paying cryptographer
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(a)
s1 s3
s4 s5
s2
t u v
(b)
{s2, s4, s5}
{s1, s3}
{s3, s4} {s1, s5}
{s4, s5}
{u}
{t} {v}
{t, v}
{v} {t}
(c)
{s4, s5}
∅
{s4} {s5}
{s4, s5}
a
a a
a
a a
(d)
{s4, s5}
∅
{s4} {s5}
{s4, s5}
a
a a
a a
Fig. 2. Step vs. interleaving semantics.
can remain anonymous w.r.t. his or her companions. Our construction is
straightforwardly extended to three or more diners.
Two cryptographers, Anne and Bob, enjoy a meal in a restaurant. When
they call for the bill, the waiter tells them that it has already been paid. Anne
and Bob each wish to know whether the bill was paid by the NSA, or if it was
one of them. However, if one of them paid, they do not want an eavesdropper,
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Yves, on the neighbouring table to know which of them paid. The protocol
they choose to solve this problem is as follows:
They toss two coins, visible to both of them, ensuring that Yves cannot
see either of them. If Anne paid, she lies about the parity of the two coins
(she calls ‘agree’ if she sees a head and a tail, and ‘disagree’ otherwise). If
Anne did not pay, she tells the truth about the parity of the coins. Similarly
for Bob. Now Anne and Bob both know if one of them paid: if their calls
are the same they know that the NSA paid, otherwise it must have been one
of them (and in this example they actually both know which). Yves, on the
other hand, can only tell whether or not one of Anne and Bob paid, but not
which one.
AP
A¬P
c1h
c1t
c2h
c2t
BP
B¬P
A0
A1
A1
A0
A1
A0
A0
A1
B0
B1
B1
B0
B1
B0
B0
B1
Fig. 3. Net for the dining cryptographers example with one of the 12 initial markings.
Figure 3 presents a possible encoding of the protocol. The two places at the
left of the diagram represent Anne’s initial state (having paid is represented
by placing a single token in place AP , and having not paid is represented by
placing a single token in place A¬P ), and the two places at the right represent
Bob’s initial state. The possible initial markings for these places are
{AP,B¬P}, {A¬P,BP}, {A¬P,B¬P}.
The top two places in the centre of the diagram represent one coin (heads is
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represented by placing tokens in place c1h, and tails is represented by placing
tokens in place c1t), and the bottom two places represent the second coin. For
each pair, the marked place must contain two tokens. This is because both
Anne and Bob must see each coin. The possible initial markings for the coins
are therefore
{c1h, c1h, c2h, c2h} {c1h, c1h, c2t, c2t}
{c1t, c1t, c2h, c2h} {c1t, c1t, c2t, c2t}
The set of possible initial markings, M0, is the cross product of the cryptog-
rapher markings and the coin markings.
The eight transitions on the left represent the eight possible scenarios for
Anne, given by two possibilities for each coin multiplied by the two possibilities
for her own initial state. Each transition on the left is labelled with ‘A0’
(if Anne says the coins ‘disagree’) or ‘A1’ (if Anne says the coins ‘agree’).
Similarly for Bob on the right. This gives the transition labelling  which will
be used for deﬁning the visibility of steps.
Yves’ observation function is simple. He can see none of the places (he
does not know the initial state of Anne and Bob, nor the state of the coins),
but he can see all of the labels of the executed transitions (he can hear all
that Anne and Bob say). In other words, for every reachable marking M and
executed step U , we have the following (see section 3.1):
obsY (M) = M |∅ = ∅
obsY (U) = (U).
Note that Yves also knows the structure of the original net, i.e., the protocol.
We wish to demonstrate that after observing the execution of transitions,
although Yves may be able to determine whether the meal was paid for by
one of the cryptographers, he can never know which one. The two (symmet-
ric) properties we wish to be initial-opaque are therefore P1 = {M ∈ M0 |
M(AP ) = 1} and P2 = {M ∈M0 | M(BP ) = 1}.
If, for example, Yves observes {A0, B1} he knows that the initial marking
was either {AP,B¬P} with either two heads or two tails, or {A¬P,BP} with
the two coins distinct. Yves cannot determine the satisfaction of either of the
two properties. Similarly if he observes {A1, B0}. Note, however, that Yves
can in either case determine the satisfaction of the property P = {M ∈M0 |
M(AP )+M(BP ) = 1}, i.e., he knows when one or other of the cryptographers
paid the bill. In terms of our framework, both P1 and P2 are initial-opaque,
but P is not. If Yves hears {A0, B0} or {A1, B1} he of course knows that
neither of the cryptographers paid.
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This example can easily be altered to model the point of view of one of
the two cryptographers. We simply change the obs function to model the
increased level of knowledge. For example, the observation function of Anne
is such that, for every reachable marking M and executed step U ,
obsAnne(M) = M |{AP,A¬P,c1h,c1t,c2h,c2t}
obsAnne(U) = (U).
Anne knows her own initial state, and can see the state of both of the coins.
Given this observation function, she learns what she wants to know — whether
or not Bob paid the bill.
5 Conclusions and future work
We have presented a Petri net framework in which a rich class of information
ﬂow requirements can be conveniently expressed and analysed. The example
of the dining cryptographers illustrates how an anonymity property can be
captured. This kind of property is problematic to capture in the traditional,
strict formulations of non-interference.
We have further presented a number of decidability results for the opacity
properties presented here.
In future work we intend to explore the formulation of richer information
ﬂow requirements, e.g., partial, conditional, intransitive ﬂows [8]. We also
intend to explore the relationship of the approach presented here to process
algebraic formulations of generalised non-interference [9] and anonymity [10].
Here, richer notions of information ﬂow are formalised as the invariance of an
appropriate abstraction of the system under certain transformations. Thus
anonymity can be expressed as invariance under permutations over a set of
identities. Message secrecy can similarly be expressed as invariance under
(length preserving) transformations of plaintext and so on.
A major challenge in such work is the choice of appropriate abstractions
to encode the adversary’s observational capabilities. This is particularly del-
icate where cryptographic mechanisms are involved. Adversary deductions,
algebraic manipulations, and key compromise complicate the modelling. It
may be that incorporating the possibility of dynamic obs mappings may help
address such issues.
We will also investigate the problem of preservation of opacity properties
under reﬁnement and composition of Petri nets.
A further line of research is to explore analogues in this framework of the
notion of non-deducibility on strategies, due to Johnson and Wittbold [12].
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This seeks to capture the possibility of a secret user and an uncleared user
colluding and using adaptive strategies to cause information ﬂows in violation
of the policy. This is likely to require more precise modelling of various ﬂavours
of non-determinism within the Petri net framework.
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